Huh?

You've got to love philosophers. They argue points with such detail that the reader is lost and the point missed.

Take, for example, this passage from William Hasker's, The Triumph of God Over Evil. Hasker has been arguing (on paper) with D.Z. Phillips, another philosopher with an opposing point of view, over the effects of a person's belief that God sometimes allows evil to build character. Phillips says that if a person has this view, it will corrupt their morals and effect the way they act or respond to evil. (Or something like that.)

Got it?

Here's what Hasker says in response...

Suppose some acquaintance of mine is suffering and is in severe financial need, a need which if not supplied will have serious negative consequences for his future life. I have the resources to meet the need, but doing so will require considerable sacrifice on my own part. So far as I can tell, if I do not meet the need no one else is likely to do so. Finally, we add the following fact: Part of God's reason for allowing this situation to develop is precisely to shake me out of my usual moral lethargy and spur me to an unaccustomed exercise of the virtue of generosity.

Now, suppose also that I accept a theodicy according to which some evils are permitted by God in order to provide people with opportunities for moral development. Will this have a negative effect on my motivation in this situation? I see no reason why it should. First, I may be quite unaware that this was God's reason for allowing the situation to develop. (My theodicy tells me that in general God sometimes acts for such a reason; it does not specify God's reasons in particular cases.) But suppose I do come to believe that God has allowed this situation to develop in part for the purpose of challenging me to act generously. Will this undermine or corrupt my motivation? It is hard to see why it should. I am still confronted by my acquaintance in this state of severe financial need; it is still the case that he will suffer greatly if the need is not med, as it apparently will not be unless I step forward to help. But now I have come to believe that God specifically intended this situation as one in which I should exercise an unaccustomed generosity. This belief should, if anything, encourage and reinforce my inclination to provide the needed assistance; I may indeed come to see this as part of my moral "vocation." The corrupting effect feared by Phillips seems entirely absent. (p. 49-50, 2008 IVP)

Why not say, "Help the guy! God wants you to do it. Phillips' moral dilemma be damned!"

I'm not much of a philosopher.